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Point:  
The need for a change of paradigms
The system of co-ordinates reflecting the 
potentialities of understanding brings up three 
blocks of thinking tradition. The first is called 
objectivism, the second subjectivism. The 
third block represents some rational search for 
compromise somewhere between the extreme 
values. This is the concept mainly spread on 
Anglo–American scientific areas, and is most 
justifiable from the perspective of so-called 
cognitive sciences.
All in all, as a consequence some initial 
suspicions came to be confirmed, suggesting 
that (1) there are no things but processes; (2) the 
‘thing’ cannot be other than an aspect or snapshot 
abstraction of the process; hence (3) cognition is 
nothing but the function of naming; therefore (4) 
description has to be regarded more as intellectual 
modelling (or presentation) than ontological 
reflection (or reproduction) (Varga, 1999).
Objectivism can be summarily characterised 
as naive realism. Its opposite, subjectivism, 
rather means just negation, a counter-trend. 
They form a false alternative to one another. 
The so-called modern conception is an 
intermediate consideration. It is more based on 
interdisciplinarity drawing from experiential/
experimental sources, reminiscent of natural 
sciences, which, for instance, cognitive sciences – 
psychology, linguistics, philosophy and biology, 
as applied to the topic – seek to form.
Example 1: What are facts?
According to acquired conceptual traditions, 
we are supposed to speak about ‘fact’ as congruent 
with “objective reality”.
This conceptual congruence implies that 
when speaking of “fact” we speak of reality 
proper. For it is presumed that the sole thing out 
of consideration is that it happened to be us to 
establish this fact, thus being somehow personally 
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involved as part of the process. A Nietzschean 
view, on the other hand, would suggest that facts 
as such are not to be found in reality at all. What 
we may still find there, considering them facts, 
are purely arbitrary human constructs at most. 
They are rather the extrapolations of our will 
aimed at power [Willen zur Macht], not more than 
some sort of artificial social constructs. From 
this perspective of the social process, at first, 
we invent something, then, as a result, we so to 
say populate the world with “facts”. Yet, this is 
extrapolation proper.
However, “objective reality” is not inherent 
in facts. Facts are ultimately nothing other than 
relational concepts, which are recording that 
in our personal existence we relate to certain 
aspects of reality in given ways. Thus, the process 
of “establishing facts” purports that we have 
selected some part – for practical reasons, e.g., 
to serve our so-called “cognition” – from some 
relative whole that we call “reality”. By this we 
concomitantly give expression to the realisation 
that we are somehow personally involved in 
the process of claiming something to be a fact. 
Accordingly, when we say “fact” we declare our 
cognitive approach to some aspects of reality 
selected from the total whole regarded as reality 
(Varga, 1995, ch. 2, 25-55).
According to the epistemological view that 
perceives the world as an aggregate of facts (this 
being the so-called naive realism), the world 
around us is composed of nothing but facts. Facts 
are simply present in our environment, being 
parts of nature. Thus, facts simply exist. They are 
given.
FraNk once made a startling remark: “For 
court purposes, what the court thinks about the 
facts is all that matters. For actual events … 
happened in the past. They do not walk into the 
court.” (Frank, 1949, 15) What does this mean? 
Only an initiative to cognition can result in the 
establishment of some relationship with those 
facts. It would be in vain to cry out: “Hey, people! 
Some fellows are killing each other here!” What 
could underlie such a cry can become a fact only 
through the process of cognition and through the 
naming done within cognition. Thus, “facts” in 
and of themselves are not parts of any trial, unless 
we – only provided that we are parties to a trial at 
all – take them there in the proper way and form.
FraNk’s expression also involves that facts 
do not “exist” in the sense that we might ascertain 
whether they prevail or not by simply observing 
their existence. Hence, facts do not “exist”. 
However, we can make statements about facts, 
in relation to facts, on their prevalence as facts, 
and so on. Therefore, from statements like “it has 
been established as a fact that…” we can definitely 
learn that (1) there is something with which we 
have entered a cognitive relationship, and (2) we 
have posited it as an element of cognition. The 
mere fact is that we make statements about states 
of affairs. More precisely, the fact lies exclusively 
in the way and by the force of which we establish 
this. So, facts are a result by the force of which 
we can establish that we have entered into a 
relationship with the existence of a thing, or with 
the accomplishment of an event – that is, with 
something the accomplishment of which is not in 
the least necessary.
This is a relational concept. Hence, to be 
able to talk about facts presupposes the existence 
and prevalence of our establishing a cognitive 
relationship with them. One of the further 
preconditions is to posit them as the subject of 
our cognition. Thus, when we speak of facts, 
we speak of something purely objective as well 
as of our subjective relationship to it. Properly 
speaking, establishing a relationship between the 
two actually leads to the stating of its prevalence 
as a fact.
What is the meaning of the extensive and 
intensive infinity of the world as termed by the 
philosophy of nature? The idea surveyed above 
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suggests the following option: the totality is 
one total entity. That is, the totality is totally 
interrelated and the separation of ‘construction’ 
from ‘operation’ within this totality can only be 
artificial, a purposefully invented purely mental 
construct. No such duality exists in “reality”, their 
discretely distinct qualities being merely human 
hypostases. Such a distinction can be made only 
on analytical grounds, for the sake and within 
the framework of our own explanation (Varga, 
1995, 93, 113 & 152). In reality conceived like 
this, the number and configurations of aspects, 
relations and potentialities are infinite. And, as a 
matter of fact, material reality does not have any 
“aspects” whatsoever. “Things” of the world – 
objects – simply exist and prevail. It is merely an 
additional aspect that we humans eventually exist 
and occasionally establish some relationship with 
certain things. However, in order to establish 
a cognitive relationship with things, we must 
endow them with certain characteristics and 
aspects. We must pick out a characteristic only 
selected by us from the total context of the total 
whole, isolate it as an independent bearer of some 
feature(s), and then name it as such. In order to be 
able to “reasonably” relate to two items we must 
create some kind of “analogy” between them by 
means of abstraction. Seeking such analogies is 
not fictitious in the sense that the characteristics 
or aspects serving as bases to an analogy are 
indeed to be prevalent regardless of our actions. 
But it is man-made and artificial in the sense that 
the characteristic concerned is identified by a 
creative human initiative through isolating those 
objects from the total whole, shedding light on and 
naming them. The number of feasible relations 
between two stones the world is infinite, and so is 
the number of possibly relevant aspects.
Social conventions, presuppositions and 
paradigms undoubtedly play a role in the processes 
of appropriating reality. For example, let us take 
an elementary situation: what can a human do 
to his partner? Within the European civilisation 
we believe that there is no magic any more, and 
even the description of nature can be achieved, to 
the extent possible, through its “own” terms (not 
presuming the direct intervention of God). The 
world becomes “reasonable” due to such – and 
not other – presuppositions and paradigms.
The primary consequence of this is that 
we at least feel comfortable somewhere and 
this is in our own culture. When in contact with 
another culture, we necessarily lose the thread of 
interpretation and the bases of understanding.1 
For example, in a culture of magic the actors must 
deal with entirely different conditions. In the 
once British Commonwealth former colonisers 
met plenty of situations in the tribal cultures 
ruled by the principles of English law, when the 
natives realised that an evil eye was cast upon 
them and they were bound to defend themselves. 
Since the evil eye is deadly, its threat must be just 
as deadly. So, it is not by mere chance that the 
defence wielded against these threats might cause 
the injury of those casting the evil eye, perhaps 
even (and justifiably) their death. However, the 
natives had to defend themselves because if they 
had not done so, they would have endangered 
not only their lives but the chances of their after-
lives as well. The British regarded such similar 
considerations as blank superstition, which they 
considered to be against the minimum conditions 
of civilisation, and since it qualified as a threat 
to life it deserved unconditioned punishment 
(Seidman, 1966; Saltman, 1991). In sum, it is our 
cultural dependence that selects the conceivable 
aspects of fundamental human relations, thus, 
among other things, what “can” qualify as facts.
Inasmuch as the world is infinite both 
extensively and intensively, the total whole 
is also wholly correlated at any given time. 
Totality is totally one, that is, totally interrelated. 
Consequently, the way we explain the construction 
and operation of the world, and what elements we 
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can use and in what configuration within it, will, 
in principle, be of infinite variety. In any kind of 
representation and reproduction, the variability of 
elements as well as the sets of arrangements and 
the configurations thereof will also be infinite. It 
is our practical interests towards and our practical 
relationship to the world that will select what we 
elevate (isolate, identify and name) from among 
these.
The Greek concept of ‘truth’ involves 
precisely such a connection. Tālethes in the 
original sense means that we elevate, pick up 
and hold something to the light (Kendal, 1980, 
especially 2, 3, 12 & 21-22). This already 
presumes some relationship. We can only 
elevate, pick up and hold something to the light 
if leaving everything else in its environment in 
the shadow. By pronouncing tālethes we confess 
that there is an agent in operation, and this is 
us, subjects who want to cognise by elevating 
something and shedding light on it. This agent 
draws something into the range of its inquiry, but 
by doing so overshadows everything else. Thus, 
the classical Greek understanding of the truth 
already implies, at least on an intuitive level, the 
recognition that truth is based on selection. By 
declaring something to be the truth we deny the 
truth (taken in the same sense) of everything else. 
That is to say, numerous other considerations 
could also be regarded as truths, but we selected 
exactly the one we needed in the given context. 
Obviously, the story here is not at all about us 
being hopelessly subjective. Conversely, what it 
speaks about is that humans create their social 
world through their practice, and they do so in a 
manner continuously fed back by the results of 
the same practice. Or, “social scientific theories 
… are based on pretheoretical suppositions. 
… They are normative assumptions about the 
nature of man, the nature of society, and the 
relationship between man and society.” (Israel, 
1978, 63)
In consequence, what we regard as self-
evident in a given context also depends on our 
cultural presuppositions. We think that water is 
simply composed of two units of hydrogen and 
one unit of oxygen. Although, closer analysis may 
reveal that in practice we know as many kinds 
of water as there are various cultural uses for it. 
So ‘water’ does not depend on its concept and 
chemical composition, but on its practical uses 
and recognised human utility as sea-water, river-
water, lake-water, brook-water, rain-water, the 
water from melted ice, or the humidity gained from 
collecting morning dew (etc.). In other words, it 
is the social interpretation of vital (geographical, 
meteorological, and further on) conditions that 
determines the types of water we distinguish and 
name in language. Some languages apply dozens 
of distinctions to specify what the clouds, rain, 
snow and ice are like, or what the water is like in 
a ditch or a brook. Hence, we can by no means 
state that ‘water’ just “exists”. For it is not the so-
called ‘water’ that exists with such self-evident 
unambiguity, but the aggregate of culturally 
defined relations within the frameworks of which 
water is perceived by us, actors, who share its 
curses and blessings in our practice (Balekjian, 
1984).
Example 2: What are notions?
The objectivist trend claims about notions 
that they (1) reflect reality; (2) have clear-cut 
boundaries; and (3) “objectively” correspond 
with reality, (4) providing a neutral, objective, and 
true perspective on reality. The subjectivist trend 
claims that notions (1) can only reflect themselves, 
(2) are arbitrary, (3) rely on historically incidental 
social conventionalisation, and (4) build on the 
continued actualisation of the respective social 
practice by re-conventionalising conventions.
Let us have a look at what the so-called 
naive realism says on the tenets of the objectivist 
trend.
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Ad (1): Is the notion a reflection? For a naive 
realist, we have reality on the one hand, and our 
thinking capacity on the other, and we reflect the 
former on the latter, while mentally processing 
the former through the instrumentality of 
language. Needless to say, we make use of our 
thinking capacity through language in order to 
mentally reconstruct reality: we reflect it, or at 
least model it, even if somewhat transforming its 
form. Patterns, however, always differ from the 
patterned to some extent, but are still the same 
concerning certain relevant and determinant 
features. They are not mechanical or photographic 
mirrors, but something to which we have also 
contributed in the process of their selection and 
creation.
Ad (2): Do notions have clear-cut boundaries? 
For a naive realist, notions are reflections of reality 
with boundaries defined by nature. By means of 
rational reconstruction, science must strive to 
draw the boundaries of notions as accurately as 
possible. So, what we achieve through cognition 
is the reflection of what has already been inherent 
in the thing.
Ad (3): Do notions “objectively” correspond 
with reality? When cognising, we only pattern 
the construction, organisation and stratification 
of reality on a conceptual plane, and, accordingly, 
our notions on reality will be nothing other than 
the reflections of the structure of reality.
Ad (4): Do notions provide a neutral, objective 
and true perspective on reality? This assumption 
suggests we should apparently be able to cognise 
without having our existence (human and social 
perspectives) reflected in the process of cognition 
in one way or another.
What does subjectivism suggest from 
the opposite positions? And, how can the 
contradiction between the two extreme views be 
converged into one synthetic cognitive view?
Ad (1): In philosophy, Nietzsche started 
arguing that man – nolens volens – always speaks 
of himself, projecting his own desires onto theses 
of cosmic dimensions even when engaged in 
theory-construction. Although we may be able 
to reveal some agreement-like congruencies 
between people, these still do not reflect reality 
but our most intimate desires at most.
This apparent extremism of subjectivism 
does not lack all truth, as far as its critical 
directions are concerned. Lukács once used in his 
Ontology of the Social Being a rather appropriate 
expression when, assessing the ontological 
correspondences of cognitive images of reality, 
he referred to “tendential unity”.2
There is a school of language philosophy, 
which claims that language is of metaphorical 
origin and nature (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
From among the pioneering opinions, VaihiNger’s 
doctrine of fictions claimed that we always act in 
a way as if doing something else: for instance, 
when we refer to a norm we actually pattern 
the desirable order of reality (Vaihinger, 1911). 
Accordingly, we do not (and cannot) know what 
reality is, but we nevertheless make certain kind(s) 
of propositions(s) about it. It is plainly enough for 
us to make it conscious that we thereby merely 
give expression to our belief that it would be 
satisfactory if reality were like this, because it 
will be enough for the successful continuation of 
our practice to posit only this much about reality.
Hence, our system of concepts is by no means 
a mechanical mirror linked to certain aspects 
of reality either arbitrarily or exhaustively, but 
an image which is concomitantly an aspect and 
conceptual projection of our human relations 
upon reality.
Ad (2): Since notions cannot be found in 
reality, it is ourselves who treat the realm of 
notions as if they had (could have) any boundaries 
at all. “The ‘reality’ which we apprehend in 
perception and direct intuition presents itself 
to us as a whole in which there are no abrupt 
separations.” (Cassirer, 1961, 141)3
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All of this by no means implies that our 
notions lack boundaries or limitations. It only 
means that when we debate and eventually 
misunderstand each other, one of the reasons 
for this may be that we use notions in different 
ways. In such a case, we must clarify with 
ourselves and between each other that we can 
only continue our debate reasonably insofar as 
we conceptually distinguish these differently 
understood notions.
For instance, equality of rights is violated 
by both positive and negative discrimination 
amongst ones supposed to be otherwise equal. 
The intervention of legal policy narrowing 
the equality of otherwise equal parties may 
in such cases weaken the principles of the 
legal order through its practical constraints, 
to fundamentalise it so as to become chaotic. 
That is, in such a practical case tertium datur 
on the final analysis. Since between the two 
extreme values – i.e., the conceptually divided 
and unconditional self-identifying affirmation, 
on the one hand, and the unconditional refusing 
negation (as, for instance, affirmative action and 
negative discrimination, standing for inclusion 
and exclusion, respectively) – both neutrality 
and well-intentioned indifference may be 
wedged in.
Our presupposition that usually follows 
such a clarification suggests that the boundaries 
of notions have now been truly set by definitions 
given this way or by some tacit means. So from 
now on it appears as if notions had boundaries 
indeed. Yet, the history of human discourse 
proves the exact opposite, and this is one decisive 
lesson of linguistic reconstruction: questions 
of boundaries arise again and again, the more 
unclear the notional relations which describe 
things, the more often. The final outcome is 
even more troublesome. As we may know from 
historical experience, social and moral issues 
cannot be settled once and for all. And this is so 
not because humans cannot recall past events due 
to their feebleness or because being natural-born 
trouble-makers they even destroy their own past 
as if driven by bad instincts. On the contrary: it 
is a basic fact of socio-ontological importance 
that in historical dimensions and in an overall 
social context man never does anything in vain, 
and whatever he ends up doing he does because 
he feels that he must – on the basis of his usual 
deliberations, sober reflexion and responsible 
choice.
Let us elucidate the issue with an example 
from legal history. After completing his 
investigations on the driving forces of Roman 
legal development, the Scottish historian of 
private law WatsoN launched another comparative 
inquiry (Watson, 1974). He proved that we can 
hardly speak of legal development proper. Man is 
one of the ugliest and laziest creatures on planet 
Earth: he does not create anything unless bare 
necessity forces him to. And if he finally ventures 
anything, he does it with minimum effort. So, 
if there is any chance, he follows beaten paths, 
works with ready tools, and always uses – by 
adapting – the ones at hand. Therefore, he invents 
something only when there is no idea or thing 
available in his environment to shape further or 
re-adapt. So necessity urges him to be creative, to 
consider making his own move, or even to invent 
something.
WatsoN’s historical justification steps from 
a trivial example. Namely, on the territory of the 
Fertile Crescent (in ancient Mesopotamia), the 
goring of an ox proved to be a deadly danger. It 
happened very often, so the question of who was 
liable for the damage and what compensation 
was due had to be regulated by law. Well, in this 
civilisation extending over an immense territory, 
all the autochtonously evolving cultures used 
the same construct, the normative wording of 
which (although in different local languages) 
was even the same (Finkelstein, 1973; Jackson, 
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1974). Looking for further proof, WatsoN found 
a similar example in JustiNiaN’s codification. 
For the conceptual distinctions and classification 
applied in JustiNiaN’s Institutiones – its structure 
and breaking down not being self-evident or 
even the sole alternative in the context of the 
late Roman historical development – have in 
fact become the standard pattern for internal 
systematisation especially of the civil law on the 
European continent. Accordingly, our entire legal 
culture seems to rely on inveterate conceptual 
incidentalities, random improvisations, findings, 
moreover, sometimes even gross errors and 
misunderstandings. For we are accustomed 
to taking every ready or half-ready tool and 
conceptual initiative from the treasury of the past 
and simply re-adapting it if we so need, often 
without any genuine critical reconsideration, 
unless some strange and rather exceptional reason 
forces us to act differently.
So, all phenomena, situations and events are 
of infinite variety. Human interest approaches 
them in various ways, differentiating and 
naming almost randomly selected correlations 
from among them as aspects, to build them back 
later into the phenomenon, situation or event 
in question in the course of their theoretical 
reconstruction. This is the reason why human 
cognition is claismed to be reflective and 
constructive at the same time.
In the final analysis, boundaries of notions are 
in function of the discourse (situation or context) 
to a certain extent. Every discourse questions and 
challenges these boundaries recurrently, because 
each discourse is in principle a new discourse: 
it differs from the previous one as it requests an 
answer for a situation somewhat modified since 
then in some of its aspects. In the same way, in 
English law, the hundreds, thousands or even 
millions of cases embodied in and by the body 
of precedents accumulated do not add up to an 
exhaustive system, for it is by far not necessary 
that the new situations emerging at any given 
time require an answer along the same path 
taken once by a past individual decision. The 
judge may recourse to novation in any phase of 
the procedure, by presenting – with reference to 
equity, justice, or to other pleas and exceptions, as 
well as measures and steps to take – the decision 
he suggests as providing a relatively new answer to 
an entirely or partially new situation, or to newly 
conceptualised facts that may constitute a case 
in law, that is, a different answer reacting more 
sensitively and suitably to the issue, in followance 
from the deliberation of those principles that may 
come into account.
As a general theoretical conclusion, in 
principle, notions are open because their closure 
cannot be but casual: done artificially, exclusively 
in given direction(s) and context(s), with validity 
for the given discourse(s) only. The availability 
of a notion in and of itself, with boundaries 
marked within and for the given discourse, never 
anticipates future boundaries. Each discourse 
has to face a new situation with new contextual 
potentialities, therefore it has a chance to resolve or 
question any kind of earlier closure by modifying 
and re-actualising these notional boundaries 
(with the prospect of re-conventionalisation).
Ad (3): This is the framework within which 
the question of whether notions can “objectively 
correspond” with reality can be raised at all. Well, 
we usually prefer those sets of notions which 
display more potential in justifiability and less in 
falsifiability. We want to maximise justification 
and minimise falsification at the same time. We 
are also bound to realise that we can only justify or 
falsify a theory by means of another theory, since 
we do not have any direct media or instruments of 
control at our disposal.
Within a given world-view and set of 
underlying paradigms, one accepts that theory 
as true, proven or at least provable, which 
corresponds the most to given methodical 
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principles of the scientific methodology accepted 
by the relevant community at a given time. Only 
that theory must be accepted and preferred 
to other feasible alternatives, which displays 
the strongest explanatory force with the least 
exposition to attack.
Summary
The respective trends can be characterised 
as summed up in the table below (Lakoff, 1989):
The progress achieved within the last 
decades from the standing positions stabilised in 
the past century is striking (Varga, 2011).
objectivism subjectivism modern conception




cognitive relationship selected by man and 
supported by his interest
system of
concepts
reflection of reality reflection of itself covered by realistic features of reality, but 





relies on arbitrary 
social convention
its openness in a given direction can only be closed 
down artificially




built upon the re-
conventionalisation 
of conventions
never detachable from the prevailing world-view, 
tradition and cultural presuppositions
logic the thing itself: 
the course, 
interconnection and 
sequence of things; 






the mathematics of descriptive propositions: claims 
that insofar as we make propositions within the 
same context and in the same time, and link these 
propositions conceptually, then, once a premise or 
conclusion is accepted as true or false, we thereby 
establish a deductive relationship between its truth 
or falsity
thinking builds upon the 
paradigm of 
distinguishing 




there is no metaphysics of things: only the practical 




relies on logical rules
builds upon personal 
conviction
progresses from 
the general to the 
concrete
its direction is 
arbitrary
1 For instance, under the conditions of the standardisation of health procedures globalised, the feasibility of a culture-
specific interpretation has as well to appear as a scientific problem (Landy, ed., 1977; MacLeod & Milton, ed., 
1988).
2 “In one way or another, these subjects are from the beginning confronted (eventually: short of perishing) with the scope 
of action given to them in the total process at any time. Accordingly, a certain tendential unity will assert itself on 
every domain, without lending a kind of absolute unity to the process (in the sense of the old materialism or as a logical 
consequence following from hegeL’s logic).” (Lukács, 1971, 296)
3 As to the use of concepts all this notwithstanding, logic separates so-called class-concepts deciding on inclusion from 
so-called order-concepts suitable only for characterisation (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1936).
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Парадигмальные предположения  
мышления в праве: философия науки  
и методология научного суждения
Чаба Варга
Венгерский Католический университет 
H-1428 Будапешт 8, А/Я 6, Венгрия
В статье рассматривается, что на самом деле означает концепция, а  также  логика 
и мышление в контрасте объективизма и субъективизма, а также их компромисс в 
постмодернизме.
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